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How Parents Are Made:
A Response to Discrimination in Baby Making: The
Unconstitutional Treatment of Prospective Parents Through
Surrogacy
KIMBERLY M. MUTCHERSON∗
INTRODUCTION
As a legal scholar deeply interested in assisted reproduction and its relationship
to the ever more complicated landscape of family, I applaud Professor Carroll for
taking on the issue of the ways in which state laws related to surrogacy potentially
infringe on constitutional rights.1 The issue being explored is both interesting and
important and, like others before her,2 Professor Carroll highlights a place of
state-sanctioned discrimination in the arena of assisted reproduction that has
constitutional dimensions.3 Such statutes, of course, fall within a long line of
legislative and policy efforts to create and/or reinforce reproductive hierarchies
built on distinctions rooted in disability status, race, age, sexual orientation, and, of
course, marital status. Therefore, it is no surprise that states use statutes related to
surrogacy as a way of protecting and encouraging the creation of certain kinds of
families and the fulfillment of certain kinds of reproductive desires. Such statutes
create a present day barrier to the procreative interests of many couples, especially
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples where one or both parties are medically
infertile, and they call for careful analysis as matters of policy and law.
Recognizing that discrimination exists across multiple axes related to
reproduction does not tell us whether any or all of that discrimination is
unconstitutional, and Carroll’s piece, while focusing on an issue worthy of deep
analysis, fails its audience in some critical respects. First, Carroll does not
sufficiently explain or contend with the complicated nature of surrogacy as a
practice or as a subject of legal regulation. Second, she uses the precedent of Baby

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law–Camden.
1. See Andrea B. Carroll, Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitutional
Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1187 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Disabling Dreams of Parenthood: The Fertility
Industry, Anti-Discrimination, and Parents with Disabilities, 27 LAW & INEQ. 311 (2009);
Brooke Dianah Rodgers-Miller, Note, Adam and Steve and Eve: Why Sexuality Segregation
in Assisted Reproduction in Virginia Is No Longer Acceptable, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 293 (2005).
3. Carroll focuses on statutes from Florida and Louisiana in her piece, but it perhaps
speaks to the modern trend to note that later statutes, such as the Illinois Gestational
Surrogacy Act passed in 2004, include no such restriction. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
47/20(b) (West 2009). In the best case scenario, then, it is possible that Carroll’s concerns
are attached to statutes that are relics that would draw very different lines if enacted today.
Even so, in addition to Florida and Louisiana, Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045
(2010), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (2002), and Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-15-801(3) (LexisNexis 2012), discriminate on the basis of marital status in their
surrogacy statutes.
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M,4 in contradictory and underexamined ways that weaken her analysis of the case
and the larger analysis of markets in gestation. Third, and finally, she fails to
adequately or convincingly make the case that statutes that discriminate on the
basis of marital status violate equal protection. As a consequence, the article
ultimately provides an inadequate account of how to protect the procreative
interests of people who want or need to have babies with the assistance of a
surrogate.
I. SURROGACY AS A CONTESTED PRACTICE
One of the most critical aspects of understanding why regulators treat surrogacy
a certain way is to understand surrogacy as a thoroughly contested practice.
Embedded within all discussions of the law’s relationship to the practice of
surrogacy are serious questions about autonomy, oppression, exploitation, and
commodification. In some way, every surrogacy statute responds to these questions
and is rooted in answering how to regulate a market in the building blocks of
procreation, including women’s bodies, and in babies. It is therefore useful to spend
some time fleshing out the context of such legislation as Carroll does in her piece. I
think it worth responding to that material, but I do so with an understanding that, by
Carroll’s own terms, none of the general concerns about surrogacy as a practice are
relevant to her claims because once the state allows surrogacy, according to Carroll
and Radhika Rao before her,5 it must do so on an even plane. However, given how
controversial surrogacy is, it is worth articulating the environment in which
lawmaking takes place in order to shed light on why lawmakers narrow the
circumstances in which surrogacy happens even if they do not ban the practice
altogether.
As a starting point to this analysis, I note that some policymakers and
commentators respond to surrogacy differently depending on whether the surrogate
is gestational or traditional.6 Further, opinions and concerns about surrogacy can
vary depending on whether the surrogate is a family member or a stranger.7
Similarly, laws and beliefs about surrogacy may shift depending on whether the
surrogate is paid or unpaid8 or whether she is hired in a developing versus

4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
5. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (2008) (arguing that when the government
regulates access to reproductive technology it must not restrict access in an unequal fashion).
6. For instance, the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act provides a framework for
creating legal protection for gestational surrogacy arrangements but does not provide
protection for traditional surrogacy arrangements. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/10,
45/15 (West 2009). By contrast, Kentucky and Louisiana law forbids traditional surrogacy
but does not speak to gestational surrogacy. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (LexisNexis
2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Using Family Members
as Gamete Donors or Surrogates, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 797 (2012) (describing pros
and cons of using a family member as a surrogate).
8. Several jurisdictions that regulate surrogacy ban such arrangements if they are done
in exchange for money but allow unpaid surrogacy. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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developed nation.9 Carroll’s piece, though, draws few of these distinctions that are
so deeply part of the broader conversation of how and why states respond to
surrogacy.
The themes of autonomy, oppression, exploitation, and commodification play
throughout Carroll’s piece but in ways that are perhaps too subtle to help the reader
understand the broad context of surrogacy regulation. A few examples will suffice
to illustrate this concern. In Carroll’s description of the Baby M case, she refers to
Mary Beth Whitehead as “a former employee of a bar and a go-go dancer.”10 It is
unclear what one is to make of this description, but perhaps it is intended to offer
background on Mrs. Whitehead or to contrast her employment history with that of
the Sterns. However, it also reminds the reader that there is frequently a gap
between the educational and economic attainment of surrogates as compared to that
of individuals who hire surrogates.11 This speaks to some of the issues of
exploitation and oppression that often accompany attempts to regulate surrogacy.
Carroll’s piece also does not clearly explain that the contract in Baby M was
between Mr. Stern, Mrs. Whitehead, and Mrs. Whitehead’s husband; Mrs. Stern
was excluded.12 The New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that her exclusion was a
ploy “to avoid the application of the baby-selling statute to this arrangement.”13
The contract also made clear in its terms that the money exchanged was not for the
sale of a child and that the parties agreed that it was in the best interest of any child
born as a result of the arrangement to be in the custody of Mr. Stern.14 So in
addition to exploitation, surrogacy regulation is about avoiding the
commodification of both women and babies that happens when babies and
women’s wombs are the subject of market exchanges.
Carroll, of course, is correct that the law has been more willing to embrace some
forms of assisted reproduction more quickly than others, but on a global scale
surrogacy is among one of the most banned forms of assisted reproduction.15
Scholars, especially feminist scholars, continue to raise serious concerns about the
§§ 26.26.210, .230 (2005) (forbidding surrogacy contracts that pay compensation beyond
covering reasonable expenses for the surrogacy); Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
2008, c. 22, § 54(8)(a)–(d) (U.K.).
9. See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Cross-Border
Reproductive Care: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY (forthcoming 2013)
(noting that “[c]oncern about exploitation of gamete donors and surrogates in destination
countries occupies much of the critique of [cross border reproductive care]”).
10. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1189.
11. While it may be the case that some surrogates are college educated and solidly
upper-middle class, many others are less financially secure, though not poor, including many
military wives who can earn more through one gestational surrogacy arrangement than their
husband’s annual base pay. Lorraine Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
29, 2008, 10:55 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/03/29/the-curiouslives-of-surrogates.html.
12. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265–70 (N.J. 1988).
13. Id. at 1235.
14. Id. at 1266.
15. See Anna Pia Ferraretti, Guido Pennings, Luca Gianaroli, Francesca Natali & M.
Cristiana Magli, Cross-Border Reproductive Care: A Phenomenon Expressing the
Controversial Aspects of Reproductive Technologies, 20 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 261,
262 (2010).
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ways in which surrogacy has the potential to exploit and injure women,16 diminish
family life,17 degrade the process of procreation and women’s role in it,18 and
devalue the worth of children.19 It is against this backdrop that states seek to
regulate surrogacy. On one hand, there are those who, because of a variety of
circumstances, including medical or social infertility, use surrogacy as a means of
bringing children into their families, often but not always with a genetic connection
to one or both parents. On the other hand, states must contend with a practice that
has enormous potential, frequently unrealized, to cause serious harm to individuals
and, perhaps, the larger society. In this sense, states are in a significant bind when it
comes to legislating surrogacy practices. That bind merits being explicitly
articulated to provide context for why states appear torn between protecting the
reproductive desires of some while also limiting access to a morally and ethically
challenging practice. It is possible that all of this background is irrelevant to the
equal protection claim that Carroll purports to answer, but it is not immediately
obvious that this is true, for all of this is relevant to why it might be rational for
state actors to circumscribe access to arrangements that potentially negatively
impact individuals, families, and the larger society for reasons other than
impermissible discrimination.
II. BABY M AS USEFUL PRECEDENT
In addition to considering the broader context of surrogacy regulation, Carroll’s
piece includes multiple discussions of the famous Baby M case. She uses the case
in ways that do not all fit logically together. For instance, Carroll argues in part that
Baby M “likely did not speak to gestational surrogacy”20 and that “Baby M’s

16. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL
LIMITS OF MARKETS 127–32 (2010); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1930–31 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHILO. &
PUB. AFF. 71, 90 (1990).
18. See, e.g., JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S FREEDOM 139–40 (1993) (describing surrogacy and other
forms of reproductive technology as a form of human trafficking); BARBARA KATZ
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 160–64 (2d ed. 2000) (“I think surrogacy is an evil
system: it diminishes women and discounts pregnancy as a relationship.”).
19. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Address, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby
Selling?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135, 135 (1995) (“Every state has a law against exchanging
consideration for obtaining a child. So if you want a contract pregnancy like surrogacy to be
legal, you have to make an exception to every state law, or else you have to repeal all of that
and say it’s okay to exchange consideration for obtaining a child.”).
20. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1191. Carroll’s argument about the distinction between
gestational surrogacy and traditional surrogacy has no bearing on marital status
discrimination in access to surrogacy services, but it is worthwhile to briefly note that
Carroll at one point refers to gestational surrogates as “merely act[ing] as a carrier for the
child.” Id. at 1190 (emphasis added). Intentional or not, this language minimizes the role of
gestation and shows a significant lack of appreciation for the myriad ways in which
surrogacy, gestational or traditional, disturbs traditional notions of family and kinship. The
resort to genetic tie as the most basic trump in the relationship between surrogates and
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lessons should, therefore, be interpreted narrowly, as limited to traditional
surrogacy.”21 However, as recently as 2009 in a New Jersey surrogacy case
involving a same-sex couple and a gestational carrier who was also the sister of one
member of the couple, a superior court judge relied heavily on Baby M to
determine that the gestational surrogate was a legal mother to the twins that she
bore.22 The court wrote, “A legal analysis of the rights involved in this matter
unquestionably begins with an understanding of In the Matter of Baby M.”23 The
court noted the genetic connection between the child and the surrogate mother in
Baby M and acknowledged that the intended parents in the case before it asserted
that the lack of genetic connection between the gestational carrier and the babies at
issue in this case distinguished the two cases and made Baby M less of a useful
precedent.24 In rejecting that argument in the case, the court wrote that “the genetic
makeup of the infant as it relates to the birth mother was only mentioned once in
Baby M”25 and that the Baby M court never limited its holding in the way that
Carroll suggests that it should be so limited.26 Further, the court determined that the
public policy considerations relevant to the court’s holding in Baby M, including
intended parents gives far too short shrift to the reality of pregnancy as a state of physical
enmeshment between a pregnant woman and the baby that she carries to term regardless of
whether her tie to that future child is genetic. It is certainly possible to imagine many
circumstances in which women feel confident about severing any bond that they have had
with a fetus, but to minimize the impact of the physical and emotional relationship
potentially created here undermines Carroll’s argument. It is possible to show deep respect
for gestation while recognizing that women may experience gestation differently depending
upon their circumstances. For instance, when a woman who intends to parent a child gestates
an embryo formed from an egg not her own, there is an extent to which gestation trumps
genetics, often (though not always) in the social and legal realms. In the social realm, seldom
would a woman be called upon to declare whether the embryo she carried and the child to
whom she gave birth were formed from her own egg or from a donated or purchased egg. As
a matter of simple definition, to mother means to give birth, without regard to genetic tie.
See WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1474 (2002) (defining a mother as “a
woman who has given birth to a child: a female parent”). In the legal realm, the law
continues to struggle with how to deal with gestation separated from genetics. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007) (banning surrogacy contracts and declaring
surrogate mothers to be the legal mothers of children they bear). But see JESSICA ARONS &
ELIZABETH CHEN, FUTURE CHOICES II: AN UPDATE ON THE LEGAL, STATUTORY, AND POLICY
LANDSCAPE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2013) (noting the requirement
of a genetic connection between parent and child, including a gestating mother, in order to
confer U.S. citizenship on a child born abroad). Arguing that genetics should always trump
gestation in surrogacy arrangements feels a bit like trying to have one’s cake and eat it too.
And while Carroll is almost certainly correct that the line between traditional and gestational
surrogacy matters in these debates, it is not clear that this line matters any more than does the
line between commercial or altruistic surrogacy, or other distinctions that might be relevant
to courts.
21. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1191.
22. See A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, slip op. at 5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Dec. 23, 2009).
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 4.
26. See id.
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concerns about baby selling and exploitation of women, are “far reaching and
unrelated to a strict genetic connection.”27 So again, as I suggested in the first
section of this response, the context of lawmaking, statutory or otherwise, has
meaning, and the background conditions that make surrogacy a contested practice
always play a role in how surrogacy is understood. Thus, an argument that Baby M
has no relevance to gestational surrogacy agreements is easily dismissed if not
sufficiently grounded in an understanding of the public policies that motivated that
decision, which need not be understood as inextricably linked to genetic tie.
After dismissing Baby M as a useful precedent because it was a traditional
surrogacy case and most present surrogacy arrangements are gestational,28 Carroll
uses that case to bolster her claim of almost certain psychological trauma for the
surrogate, the intended parents, and the children born through a surrogacy
arrangement.29 She then claims that such trauma is likely diminished in gestational
surrogacy without explaining why this should be the case or why it should even
matter to her analysis.30 If it is true, as she seems to argue in part, that
psychological trauma attends surrogacy arrangements almost all of the time and for
all parties involved, that standing alone seems like a rational reason why states
might seek to limit the number of such agreements that happen and the
circumstances in which they occur, even if not banning them altogether.
Carroll also asserts that the Baby M court came to the ultimate conclusion “that
surrogacy agreements must not be enforced,”31 which is not exactly the court’s
conclusion. The court explicitly states that it “find[s] no offense . . . where a
woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a ‘surrogate’ mother,
provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child.”32 In
this way, Baby M was less clear-cut than Carroll’s narrative suggests, and,
therefore, it continues to resonate for how courts, policymakers, and, for that
matter, lay people think about the institution of surrogacy.
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM: WHY THE STATUS OF PARENTS MATTERS TO
CHILDREN
The question of the proper level of scrutiny to apply in these cases is certainly
foundational. The turn away from claims based on fundamental rights analysis
saves Carroll the difficulty of making the fundamental right argument for the use of
assisted reproductive technology (ART), but it creates an equally thorny problem
by rejecting the notion of marital status discrimination based on the rational basis
test. I cannot agree with Carroll’s assertion that the standard applied to statutes that
withhold access to surrogacy based on marital status “does not matter.”33 In fact, as
is true in so many cases, the standard of review is critical and perhaps decisive. No
doubt Carroll would argue that the case for the unconstitutionality of marriage

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 5.
See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1190–91.
Id. at 1201.
See id. at 1203.
Id. at 1190.
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988).
Carroll, supra note 1, at 1197.
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based restrictions on access to surrogacy is strengthened if access to ART is a
fundamental right. Similarly, the case for unconstitutionality might be strengthened
by noting that such statutes work a particular violence on the procreative choices of
same-sex couples, especially gay men. One might imagine that the kind of rigorous
rational basis review applied in Lawrence v. Texas34 or Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health35 would give Carroll much more fodder for her claim of
unconstitutional discrimination, but Carroll does not avail herself of these avenues
of argument.
Rather, to make her case that the state has no basis for distinguishing between
married couples and unmarried couples or single people for purposes of access to
surrogacy, Carroll articulates and quickly rejects several rationales put forth in
cases related to contraception, especially Eisenstadt v. Baird.36 She bases her
rejection of these arguments on “the importance of procreative liberty in American
jurisprudence.”37 Of course, the equal protection claim that she imagines will not
hinge on the importance of procreative liberty or the fact that the Court has in
multiple cases found such liberty to be fundamental.38 Instead, she puts a violation
of equal protection in the category of rational basis review, which requires that the
state show that “an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to
the members of the disadvantaged class.”39 Given this standard, Carroll’s argument
simply does not persuade.
Carroll may be right that rationales about protecting health or preserving
morality,40 as argued in cases not involving ART, might need to fall if the state
made such claims for marital status discrimination in surrogacy statutes because
they would be relevant to all surrogacy arrangements and not just those entered into
by single or unmarried couples. But these claims seem like strawmen. They are so
unrelated to the marital status discrimination and so specious that it is difficult—if
not impossible—to imagine that a state would even raise them in this context as a
basis for discrimination rather than a complete ban.
But another claim that Carroll rejects with ease warrants more delicate treatment
than she offers it. She asserts that the state has no valid interest in using surrogacy
statutes to channel procreation into marital units because surrogacy has nothing to
do with sex and procreation.41 This argument just does not hold up under scrutiny.
She points to the work of Richard Storrow who notes, correctly, that “[m]arriage
has been an important component of social systems worldwide for millennia. Its
value to contemporary American Society is primarily as a socially sanctioned locus

34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1198.
38. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
39. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
40. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1199.
41. See id. at 1200.
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for sexual activity, procreation, and support for children.”42 While Carroll is right
that surrogacy statutes cannot be used to channel sexual activity, they most
certainly can play a role in channeling procreation into particular familial units.
Faced with a challenge to a marital status distinction in its surrogacy laws, it is
much more likely that the state would argue, with data to back it up, that children
benefit from being born into families with married parents. A state with such a
limitation on the use of surrogacy would claim that “[c]hildren are less likely to
thrive in cohabiting households, compared to intact, married families.”43 As the
Institute for American Values notes in its report, Why Marriage Matters:
On many social, educational, and psychological outcomes, children in
cohabiting households do significantly worse than children in intact,
married families, and about as poorly as children living in single-parent
families. And when it comes to abuse, recent federal data indicate that
children in cohabiting households are markedly more likely to be
physically, sexually, and emotionally abused than children in both
intact, married families and single-parent families . . . . Only in the
economic domain do children in cohabiting households fare
consistently better than children in single-parent families.44
In fact, the benefit of marriage for children in terms of economic and emotional
stability is often cited as a reason to extend marriage equality to same-sex couples.
For instance, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, a seminal marriage
equality case, the court wrote:
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly
or indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal
and economic protections obtained by civil marriage. Notwithstanding
the Commonwealth’s strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions
between marital and nonmarital children in providing for the support
and care of minors, . . . the fact remains that marital children reap a
measure of family stability and economic security based on their
parents’ legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as
readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of these benefits are
social, such as the enhanced approval that still attends the status of
being a marital child. Others are material, such as the greater ease of
access to family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the
presumptions of one’s parentage.45

42. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 305, 318 (2006).
43. INST. FOR AM. VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 7 (3d ed. 2011).
44. Id.
45. 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Bill Keller, OpEd, About the Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2013, at A19 (describing the benefits denied to
the children of same-sex couples when their parents cannot legally marry).
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A state that draws a marital status distinction in its statute, then, could persuasively
argue that it is using marriage as a shorthand or proxy for other elements that the
state prefers to see when people engage in a process with the end goal of creating a
child for whom the state has an obligation to provide protection. The state, then, is
not drawing baseless distinctions but is using data to help discern what
circumstances are most likely to produce the familial stability that children need.46
Carroll also asks far too much of the state, under rational basis review, when she
rejects an argument based on the needs of a child because the state cannot “ensure
the child’s continued support or care by two parents” given that the parents could
end up divorcing.47 There is no reason to think that rational basis review requires
the state to guarantee that a child will be raised in any particular configuration. The
state must only have a rational basis for asserting that such unions accrue to the
benefit of children and that people who are married are more likely to provide such
a union than are people who are cohabitating, people whose unions are less stable,
or a single individual. The burden that Carroll places on the state proves too much.
Based solely on the state’s interest in providing children with stable familial
circumstances, it is much less certain than Carroll suggests that the only reason a
state would draw a distinction between married and unmarried couples’ use of
surrogacy is bald prejudice or societal disapproval. While it may be the case that
this is what sits underneath such statutes, particularly as a historical matter, to make
the claim that this is all that supports such claims in the present is weak.
Where favorable surrogacy laws exist, a consistent thread that runs through
them is a commitment to clearly describe the parentage of children born through
surrogacy.48 That surrogacy statutes are consistent about dealing with this issue
makes sense because they are at their core about protecting the most vulnerable
nonparty to the contract—the child. No doubt, states have a keen interest in the
children born of surrogacy as they have a keen interest in the birth of all children
and the marital status distinction is, arguably, simply another way of acting on
behalf of the children of surrogacy. Let me be clear that in rejecting Carroll’s claim
I am not supporting a marital status requirement for the use of surrogacy. In other
work, I have expressed strong support for state backing for the right to procreate
and parent for marginalized families, including those formed by people who
experience discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.49 The

46. And, of course, marital status discrimination in access to ART is not pervasive but is
not completely anomalous. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Marital Status and Sexual
Orientation Discrimination in Infertility Care, 3 L.J. SOC. JUST. 99, 102 (2012).
47. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1204.
48. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy Act, Pub. Act 93-0921, 2004 Ill. Laws 3256
(codified as amended at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2.5, 45/6, 47/1–47/75 (West 2009 &
Supp. 2012)).
49. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to
Cross Border Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349 (2012)
(arguing in part that travel restrictions on the use of ART could have a pernicious impact on
people who experience sexual orientation based discrimination in their countries of origin);
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 187
(2013) (arguing in part for the importance of protecting access to assisted reproduction for
marginalized families including those created by lesbians and gay men).

1216

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1207

concern here is not that Carroll is wrong as a normative matter, but that she fails to
make her case.
CONCLUSION
I will end where I began by asserting again that as a policy matter I strongly
reject the notion that states should draw distinctions based on marital status when
people seek to use surrogacy for the purpose of creating a child. Though Carroll
does not offer a paradigm case of who is impacted by such a distinction, one can
surmise that same-sex couples, particularly gay men, are hard hit by such laws in a
world in which marriage equality is the exception instead of the rule. Therefore, in
the interest of inclusion, one might reject the notion of marital status as a barrier to
making babies with surrogacy, but that is not the same as suggesting that there is no
rational reason to believe that marriages, no matter the sex of those involved,
provide quantifiable benefits to the children born into them. As intimated in the
previous section, arguments rooted in fundamental rights or even in discrimination
based on sexual orientation might provide a stronger foundation for Carroll’s
claims, but in choosing to leave those arguments behind she makes her conclusions
and the people who would benefit from those conclusions substantially vulnerable.

